


Performance Measure and Incentives in Regional Employment Offices: The Swiss Approach and a Test with German Data

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Abstract

Different countries have already introduced systems to evaluate regional employment services. Starting point of this contribution is the Swiss approach, which, in his basic concept is a big step forward to market simulation with direct performance-based incentives. The national office sets the strategic targets and the cantons with their regional employment offices are widely independent and responsible for the operative implementation. Theoretical foundation of the approach is the principal-agent theory: efficiency of the agents is compared to that of others offering similar products or services. By testing the model with German data it can be shown the general applicability. But the test also gives an illustrative insight into main problems and restrictions of such an approach. Reasons can be seen in the high demands on data quality, target specification and the methods used.



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